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In	 patent	 laws	 around	 the	world,	 exclusive	 licensees	 often	 have	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	
actions	 if	 the	 relevant	 patentee(s)	 is	 also	 added	 to	 the	 suit.	 Australian	 patent	 legislation	 specifies	
that	exclusive	 licensees	have	this	power	and,	correspondingly,	 the	definition	of	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	
clearly	 permits	 licensees	 to	 initiate	 infringement	 actions	 if	 they	 exclusively	 control	 the	 full	
complement	 of	 rights	 conferred	 by	 a	 patent.	 However,	 an	 important	 question	 remains:	 Does	 the	
definition	of	exclusive	licensee	include	licensees	that	exclusively	control	only	a	portion	of	the	rights	
conferred	by	a	patent	 (e.g.	 to	 import	and	sell	an	 invention	but	not	make	 it)?	The	Full	Court	of	 the	
Federal	Court	of	Australia	has,	through	legislative	interpretation,	recently	answered	this	question	in	
the	negative.	Arguably,	this	 interpretation	 is	correct	as	a	matter	of	statutory	construction,	but	 is	 it	
correct	as	a	matter	of	patent	policy?	This	article	examines	this	final	question	via	two	approaches:	(i)	
by	 extending	 the	 orthodox	 economic	 rationale	 for	 patents	 to	 the	 issue	 at	 hand,	 in	 particular	 by	
examining	 the	 role	 of	 exclusive	 licensing	 in	 market	 economies;	 and	 (ii)	 by	 evaluating	 the	 role	 of	
standing	for	exclusive	licensees	in	the	context	of	world	patent	harmonisation	and	the	corresponding	
approaches	in	the	UK	and	US.	

































Standing	 is	a	 requirement	of	many	 legal	actions.	Essentially,	a	party	has	 to	 show	that	 they	have	a	
certain	 threshold	 of	 interest	 in	 a	 case	 before	 they	 will	 be	 eligible	 to	 litigate.	 Standing	 is	 often	
associated	with	 constitutional	 and	 administrative	 law	 actions;	 however,	 a	 recent	 series	 of	 judicial	
decisions	 addressing	 the	 issue	 have	 now	 arisen	 in	 Australian	 patent	 law,	 raising	 questions	 about	
whether	the	current	operation	of	the	law	is	desirable.	Like	patent	legislation	around	the	world,	the	
Australian	 legislation,	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1990	 (‘the	 Patents	 Act’),	 specifies	 various	 standing	









licensee	 and	 persons	 authorised	 by	 the	 licensee,	 the	 right	 to	 exploit	 the	 patented	 invention	
throughout	the	patent	area	to	the	exclusion	of	the	patentee	and	all	other	persons.’6		
The	Australian	decisions	 alluded	 to	 above	have	highlighted	 issues	with	 the	definition	of	 ‘exclusive	
licensee’.	More	specifically,	controversy	surrounds	whether	an	exclusive	licensee	is	constituted	only	
by	a	party	who	controls	the	full	complement	of	rights	conferred	in	a	patent	—	hereafter,	this	type	of	
exclusive	 licence	will	be	referred	as	a	 ‘panoplied	exclusive	 licence’,	 in	reliance	on	the	etymological	
root	of	 ‘panoply’	 as	 a	 complete	 suit	 of	 armour.7	Or,	 in	 the	 alternative,	 the	definition	of	 ‘exclusive	
licensee’	also	includes	a	licensee	who	receives	exclusivity	to	a	partitioned	sphere	of	rights	in	a	patent	
(a	 ‘partitioned	 exclusive	 licence’).8	 Three	 variations	 of	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licences	 have	 been	



















a	 geographic	 area	 smaller	 than	 the	 ‘patent	 area’,10	 and	 the	 third	 occurs	when	 a	 licensee	 has	 the	
exclusive	 right	 to	 exploit	 a	 patent	 in	 a	 specific	 field	 of	 use.	 These	 three	 types	 of	 licences	 will	 be	




The	 primary	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 the	 standing	 requirements	 for	 exclusive	
licensees	under	the	Patents	Act	are	coherent	with	its	underpinnings,	and	if	not,	recommend	reform.	
There	 is	 sparse	 commentary	on	 standing	 in	Australian	patent	 law,	and	none	 that	engages	with	 its	
justifications	 or	 jurisprudential	 underpinnings.12	 Extrinsic	 material	 to	 the	 Patents	 Act	 has	 not	
addressed	the	issue	either	and,	until	a	spate	of	cases	in	the	last	10	years,	there	had	been	little	case	
law.13	In	2015,	the	Intellectual	Property	Committee	of	the	Business	Law	Section	of	the	Law	Council	of	
Australia	 wrote	 a	 submission	 to	 IP	 Australia	 (the	 Australian	 Government	 agency	 that	 administers	
intellectual	property	 rights)	addressing	standing	 for	exclusive	 licensees.14	This	 submission	 focussed	















obligations	 under	 the	 Australia-United	 States	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement,15	 it	 did	 not	 touch	 upon	 the	
justifications	 for	 patent	 law.	 As	 described	 in	 greater	 detail	 below,	 judicial	 decisions	 and	
commentaries	from	other	jurisdictions	have	made	inroads	into	the	question	addressed	in	this	article,	
but	none	have	dealt	with	 it	comprehensively.	As	a	result,	 it	 is	difficult	to	 judge	whether	Australian	
standing	requirements	meet	legislative	aims	or	are	consistent	with	patent	jurisprudence.		
This	 article	 develops	 an	 economic-based	 theory	 for	 exclusive	 licensees	 to	 initiate	 patent	
infringement	 actions	 based	 on	 orthodox	 justifications	 for	 patent	 law.	 Furthermore,	 to	 put	 the	






inventions	to	markets;	and	part	4	explores	standing	requirements	 for	exclusive	 licensees	 in	the	US	
and	 UK.	 This	 article	 concludes	 by	 observing	 that,	 consistent	 with	 patent	 jurisprudence	 and	





standing	 in	Australian	patent	 law.	Patent	 licences,	 at	 their	most	basic,	 are	 a	 type	of	 contract	 that	
operates	as	a	mechanism	for	patentees	to	electively	permit	others	to	practise	their	invention.	Within	
the	 broad	 confines	 of	 laws	 relevant	 to	 licences,	 such	 as	 competition	 and	 contract	 law,	 patentees	
have	 freedom	 to	 contract.	 Thus,	 they	may	 include	 a	 variety	 of	 terms	 including	 those	 directed	 to	
panoplied	or	partitioned	exclusive	licences.	Sec.	120(2)	of	the	Patents	Act	specifies	that,	although	a	
patentee	may	begin	infringement	proceedings	alone,	when	an	exclusive	licensee	initiates	an	action,	
the	 patentee	 must	 be	 ‘joined	 as	 a	 defendant	 unless	 joined	 as	 a	 plaintiff’.16	 The	 Australian	 Law	
Reform	Commission,	 in	 their	 report	 on	 gene	 patents	 and	 human	health,	 stated	 that,	 in	 effect,	 an	
exclusive	licensee	‘stands	in	the	shoes	of	the	patent	holder,	subject	to	any	additional	terms	relating	
to	enforcement	of	patent	 rights	 in	 the	 licence	agreement	 (for	example,	allocation	of	any	damages	














sum	payments	not	 linked	 to	 the	 success	of	 the	product	 protected	by	 the	patent.	 In	 this	 scenario,	
they	will	receive	payments	regardless	of	any	enforcement.	
Sec.	187	of	the	Patents	Act	requires	that	licences,	assignments	and	other	particulars	of	patents	must	
be	 registered.20	 In	 Stack	 v	 Brisbane	 City	 Council	 (No	 2),21	 Drummond	 J	 held	 that	 the	 combined	
interpretation	of	Secs.	120	and	187	meant	that	an	unregistered	assignee	could	not	ordinarily	bring	
an	 infringement	 action	 in	 their	 own	 name.22	 However,	 the	 position	 is	 different	 for	 exclusive	
licensees:	 in	 Grant	 v	 Australian	 Temporary	 Fencing	 Pty	 Ltd,23	 Holmes	 J	 held	 that	 because	 the	
definition	of	‘exclusive	licensee’	does	not	include	a	reference	to	registration,	it	 is	not	necessary	for	
an	exclusive	licensee	to	be	registered	for	them	to	initiate	infringement	actions.24		
Three	 further	 ancillary	 aspects	 of	 licences	 should	 be	 noted.	 First,	 parties	 to	 a	 licence	 cannot	
retrospectively	 change	 the	 rights	 and	 obligations	 between	 them.25	 This	 means	 that	 a	 contract	
written	as	a	non-exclusive	 licence	and	which	operates	as	one,	cannot	be	amended	to	state	that	at	
any	time	in	the	past	it	operated	as	an	exclusive	licence.	Second,	whether	a	licence	is	sole,	exclusive,	

























Patents	Act	1952,	and	the	contemporary	standing	 interpretation	 issues	 in	Australia	begin	under	 it.	
Sec.	 114(1)	 of	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1952	 specified	 that	 an	 ‘exclusive	 licensee	 may	 bring	 an	 action	 or	
proceeding	for	the	infringement	of	a	patent’.29	‘Exclusive	licensee’	was	defined	to	mean	‘a	licensee	
under	 a	 licence	 granted	 by	 the	 patentee	 which	 confers	 on	 the	 licensee,	 or	 on	 the	 licensee	 and	
persons	 authorised	 by	 him,	 the	 right	 to	 make,	 use,	 exercise	 and	 vend	 the	 patented	 invention,	
throughout	 Australia,	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 all	 other	 persons,	 including	 the	 patentee.’30	 For	 reasons	
that	will	become	apparent	below,	it	is	convenient	to	note	that	the	exclusive	rights	conferred	under	
Sec.	69	of	the	Patents	Act	1952	were	to	‘make,	use,	exercise	and	vend	the	invention…’.31		
In	 the	 1963	 case,	 Ex	 parte	 British	 Nylon	 Spinners	 (‘British	 Nylon	 Spinners’),32	 the	 High	 Court	 of	
Australia33	 was	 asked	 to	 determine	 whether	 either	 of	 the	 two	 licensee	 applicants	 qualified	 as	
exclusive	 licensees	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 patent	 term	 extension.34	 Under	 Sec.	 95	 of	 the	 Patents	 Act	
1952,	 only	 exclusive	 licensees	 and	 patentees	 could	 apply	 for	 an	 extension,	 and	 the	 definition	 of	
exclusive	 licensee	was	 the	 same	 for	 patent	 term	extension	 as	 it	was	 for	 standing.35	 The	patent	 in	
question	related	to	an	‘improved	process	for	melt-spinning	nylon	yarn’.36	The	contract	with	the	first	
licensee	exclusively	allowed	the	 licensee	to	 ‘make,	use,	exercise	and	vend’	the	 invention	when	the	
filament	of	 yarn	was	 .09	mm	or	 less37	—	a	 field-of-use	exclusive	 licence.	 The	 second	 licensee	was	
permitted	 to	 control	 all	 the	 rights	 in	 the	 patent	 subject	 to	 the	 first	 licensee’s	 rights.38	 The	 Court	





















the	questions	of	whether	activity-based	exclusive	 licensees	or	 geographic	exclusive	 licensees	have	
standing	under	the	Patents	Act,	 recent	cases	have	revisited	British	Nylon	Spinners	and	emphasised	
its	 importance.	 These	 cases	 begin	 with	 Grant	 v	 Australian	 Temporary	 Fencing	 Pty	 Ltd.	 Before	









counter	 claim	 to	 infringement	 and	 defence.41	 Amongst	 the	 defendant’s	 arguments	 was	 that	 the	
licensee	 did	 not	 satisfy	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	 under	 the	 Patents	 Act	 because	 the	
licence	did	not	confer	all	 the	activities	 in	the	definition	of	 ‘exploit’.	More	precisely,	 the	 licence	did	
not	confer	the	ability	to	import	products.42	In	her	Honour’s	decision,	Holmes	J	noted	that	the	rights	
conferred	 by	 a	 patent	 had	 changed	 between	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1952	 and	 the	 Patents	 Act;	 more	
specifically,	 patent	 rights	 were	 exhaustively	 listed	 in	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1952,	 whereas	 they	 are	
inclusively	defined	in	the	Patents	Act.43	In	light	of	these	differences,	her	Honour	raised	the	possibility	
that	 the	 Patents	 Act	 could	 be	 read	 to	 convey	 standing	 on	 a	 ‘plurality’	 of	 exclusive	 licensees.44	
However,	Holmes	J	did	not	decide	the	case	on	this	point;	rather,	her	Honour	found	that	the	licence	
in	question	was	actually	a	panoplied	exclusive	licence.	Holmes	J	reasoned	that	because	the	definition	












because	 it	 left	 no	 residual	 rights	 to	 the	 licensor,	 referred	 to	 it	 as	 being	 exclusive,	 and	 included	 a	
provision	 to	 reduce	 the	 licence	 to	 a	 non-exclusive	 one,46	 that,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 summary	
judgment,	the	licence	was	a	panoplied	exclusive	licence	and	therefore	the	plaintiff	had	standing.47	
In	Pharmacia	Italia	SpA	v	Interpharma	Pty	Ltd,48	a	licensee	sought	an	interlocutory	injunction	against	
the	 respondent	 for	 importing	 an	 anti-tumour	 drug.49	 The	 respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 applicant	
lacked	 standing	 to	 bring	 the	 action	 because	 they	 failed	 to	 satisfy	 the	 definition	 of	 an	 ‘exclusive	
licensee’.	 Prior	 to	 the	 applicant	 obtaining	 their	 licence,	which	was	 purported	 to	 be	 exclusive,	 the	
patentee	 granted	 a	 licence	 to	 another	 party,	which	 remained	on	 foot.50	 Sundberg	 J	 engaged	with	
Holmes	 J’s	 idea	 of	 multiple	 exclusive	 licences	 under	 Sec.	 120,	 and	 held	 that,	 based	 on	 this,	 the	
licensee	had	‘an	arguable	case’	that	it	had	standing	to	initiate	proceedings.51		
In	 Bristol-Myers	 Squibb	 Co	 v	 Apotex	 Pty	 Ltd	 (No	 5),52	 the	 first	 applicant	 was	 the	 commercialising	




the	 first	applicant	was	not	an	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	because	 it	 could	not	exclusively	exercise	 the	 full	
range	of	activities	under	the	definition	of	‘exploit’.56	Being	the	first	full	hearing	to	decide	the	issue,	











































that	 exclusive	 geographic	 licences	 are	 unlikely	 to	 confer	 standing	 because	 the	 ‘indivisible	 right	 of	



















the	patented	 invention	 throughout	 the	patent	area	 to	 the	exclusion	of	 the	patentee	and	all	other	
persons’,	and	‘patent	area’	is	defined	to	include	Australia	and	the	Australian	continental	shelf,69		the	
respondent	 argued	 that	 the	 licensee	 did	 not	 have	 standing.70	 On	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 this	 case	 it	
appears	that	Kiefel	J	would	have	ordinarily	found	that	the	applicant	did	not	have	standing;	however,	






This	part	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 sections:	 the	 first	 addresses	economic-based	 justifications	 for	patent	
law	 as	 applied	 to	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	 suits;	 the	 second	 considers	 other	 related	 legal	




for	 standing	 in	 intellectual	 property	 law	 but	 do	 not	 comprehensively	 address	 standing	 for	
partitioned	exclusive	 licensees.72	This	article	extends	their	 reasoning.	At	 the	beginning	of	Blair	and	
Cotter’s	analysis,	the	authors	outline	three	assumptions	that	are	also	adopted	here.73	First,	the	main	
contemporary	 justification	 underpinning	 patent	 law	 is	 that	 the	 conferral	 of	 exclusive	 rights	 in	
inventions	 incentivises	 innovation	 and	 is	 welfare	 enhancing.74	 Blair	 and	 Cotter	 note	 that	 this	
justification	is	open	to	some	doubt.75	They	also	acknowledge,	however,	that	whether	patent	regimes	
have	 a	 net	 positive	 effect	 is	 a	 complex	 question	without	 a	 definitive	 answer.76	 As	 the	 aim	of	 this	

















issue,	 it	 would	 be	 confined	 to	 certain	 industries	 in	 certain	 time	 periods	 and	 therefore	 would	
probably	be	better	addressed	elsewhere	than	in	standing	law.79		
Beyond	Blair	and	Cotter’s	analysis	of	this	second	assumption,	further	support	can	be	found	for	it	in	
application	 of	 fundamental	 economic	 principles.	 In	 the	 background	 of	 patent	 law	 is	 the	 broad	
structure	of	 a	 free	market	 economy,	which	 is	 based	upon	 the	 assumption	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	of	
market	failure,	it	will	efficiently	allocate	resources.80	Key	features	of	market	economies,	relevant	to	
the	 analysis	 here,	 include,	 division	 of	 labour,	 decentralised	 decision	 making,	 and	 Adam	 Smith’s	
‘invisible	hand’.	 ‘Division	of	 labour’	 refers	 to	 the	development	of	 specialised	 skill	 sets	 for	 efficient	
production	 of	 goods.	 As	 Adam	 Smith,	 the	 father	 of	 modern	 economics,	 observed,	 ‘the	 greatest	
improvement	 in	 the	 productive	 powers	 of	 labour,	 and	 the	 greater	 part	 of	 the	 skill,	 dexterity,	 and	
judgment	 with	 which	 it	 is	 anywhere	 directed,	 or	 applied,	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 the	 effects	 of	 the	
division	 of	 labour.’81	 ‘Decentralised	 decision	 making’,	 as	 it	 is	 used	 here,	 refers	 to	 the	 ability	 of	
individual	actors	to	decide	on	how	to	manage	property.	It	is	critical	to	Adam	Smith’s	‘invisible	hand,’	
which,	 as	 it	 is	 commonly	 understood,	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 social	 benefits	 arise	 from	 self-motivated	





survey	 of	 Australian	 inventors	 shows	 that	 of	 2689	 respondents	 who	 had	 a	 pending	 or	 granted	
patent,	over	43%	reported	that	attempts	were	made	to	licence	or	sell	their	invention.83	There	is	no	
doubt	 that	 some	 technology	 is	 licensed	 or	 sold	 because	 patentees	 want	 to	 move	 on	 to	 other	
projects.	In	general,	however,	the	reality	is	that	quite	often	patentees	do	not	have	the	expertise	to	
take	 an	 invention	 from	 concept	 to	 market.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 new	 revelation.	 In	 industries,	 such	 as	











reduce	 it	 to	 practice,	 create	 a	 prototype,	 receive	 funding,	 create	 appropriate	 business	 structures,	
and	 then	market	 and	 distribute	 a	 product.84	 These	 areas	 of	 expertise,	 of	which	 others	 also	 exist,	
provide	 an	 illustration	 of	 the	 division	 of	 labour	 that	 exists	 in	 modern	 innovation.	 Accordingly,	
without	compelling	evidence	 to	 the	contrary,	 it	 is	 relatively	easy	 to	subscribe	 to	Blair	and	Cotter’s	
second	assumption.	
The	first	two	assumptions	lead	naturally	to	the	third,	that	patent	rights	should	not	have	their	value	
diminished	 based	 on	 the	 way	 they	 are	 transferred.85	 Two	 key	 considerations	 underpinning	 this	
assumption	are	 that	 although	exclusive	patent	 rights	 are	an	exception	 to	a	 free	market	economy,	





value	 of	 them	 is	 reduced.88	 On	 this	 basis,	 Blair	 and	 Cotter	 conclude	 that	 panoplied	 exclusive	
licensees	and	patentees	should,	by	default,	have	standing	so	that	they	can	protect	their	interests	in	
any	 exclusive	 rights.89	 For	 patentees	 in	 a	 licence	 agreement,	 the	 interest	 protected	 is	 any	
reversionary	interest	and	any	royalty	stream	that	may	accrue	through	continuing	royalty	payments.	
For	 panoplied	 exclusive	 licensees,	 the	 interested	 protected	 is	 the	 exclusivity	 for	 which	 they	
bargained.90	
As	 explored	 in	 part	 2	 of	 this	 article,	 current	 Australian	 standing	 law	 for	 patentees	 and	 panoplied	
exclusive	licensees	aligns	with	Blair	and	Cotter’s	rationale	by	conferring	standing	on	them.	Although	
Australian	law	does	not	currently	confer	standing	on	partitioned	exclusive	licensees,	whether	or	not	
















only	 to	exclude	others	 from	exploiting	 it.91	When	a	non-exclusive	 licence	 is	 granted,	 the	patentee	
agrees	 not	 to	 exercise	 patent	 rights	 against	 the	 licensee,	 and	 the	 patentee	 retains	 the	 option	 to	
licence,	 or	 commercialise	 the	 invention	 in	 any	 other	 applicable	 manner.	 Thus,	 if	 a	 non-exclusive	
licensee	 had	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement,	 this	would	 derogate	 from	 the	 patentee’s	 ability	 to	
choose	 how	 to	 exploit	 their	 invention,	 and	 therefore	 the	 rights	 they	 have	 been	 granted.	
Furthermore,	 a	 non-exclusive	 licensee	 has	 not	 been	 promised	 any	 exclusivity	 to	 exercise	 an	
invention,	 and	 to	 obtain	 this	 they	 would,	 usually,	 have	 had	 to	 pay	 more.	 Thus,	 although	 a	 non-












The	 definition	 of	 an	 ‘exclusive	 licence’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 patent	 law,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 part	 4	
below,	differs	between	jurisdictions.	However,	exclusive	licences	also	have	universal,	uncontentious	


















to	 infringement	 actions;	 and	 Rule	 9.03,	 in	 a	 somewhat	 overlapping	 way,	 specifies	 that	 ‘[i]f	 an	
applicant	claims	relief	to	which	any	other	person	is	entitled	jointly	with	the	applicant…	every	person	
so	entitled	must	be	joined	as	a	party	to	the	proceeding’.94	Thus,	between	Sec.	120(2)	and	Rule	9.03,	
if	 an	 alleged	 infringer’s	 activities	 encroach	upon	 rights	 in	 a	 patent,	 then	 all	 the	 relevant	 licensees	
must	also	be	added,	and	there	is	no	chance	of	multiple	suits.	The	second	interest	described	by	Hand	
J	 is	 that	 licensee	 standing	 should	 not	 derogate	 from	 a	 patentee’s	 ability	 to	 licence	 other	 parties.	
Whilst	 this	 is	 clearly	a	vital	 issue	 for	patentees,	 in	 the	context	of	partitioned	exclusive	 rights	 in	an	
exclusive	 licence,	 the	 ability	 to	 licence	 the	 partitioned	 element	 to	 other	 parties	 is	 voluntarily	
foregone	by	the	patentee	when	the	licence	is	struck.	Thus,	this	interest	is	accounted	for	too.	







means	 that	by	being	awarded	patent	 rights,	a	patentee	 is	allocated	 the	exclusive	ability	 to	exploit	
the	invention	(these	exclusive	rights	are	designed	to	help	the	inventor	recoup	costs	expended	in	its	
development	 and	 commercialisation).96	 The	 ability	 to	 enforce	 these	 rights	 is	 also	 bestowed	 on	
patentees	 because	 without	 them	 the	 value	 of	 the	 allocated	 resource	 would	 be	 significantly	
diminished.97	 The	 significance	 of	 this	 reasoning	 surrounding	 the	 orthodox	 justifications	 for	 patent	
law	 flows	 through	 to	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 if	 a	 partitioned	 exclusive	
licensee	cannot	enforce	 rights	 it	has	bargained	 for,	 then	 the	value	of	 the	 right	 is	 reduced	and	 the	
licensee	will	pay	 less	 for	the	right.	Second,	 it	 is	 logical	 that	a	party	who	 is	exclusively	permitted	to	
practise	 a	 partitioned	 element	 of	 a	 patented	 invention	 can	 choose	 how	 and	 when	 to	 enforce	 it	











may	 have	 well-established	 distribution	 channels	 in	 a	 geographic	 area,	 or	 a	 party	 may	 have	
developed	goodwill	in	a	specific	field,	and	it	is	more	efficient	for	a	party	in	those	positions	to	practise	
the	invention.	Indeed,	in	Australia,	geographic	exclusive	licences	are	often	suited	to	purpose,	as	the	
layout	 of	 the	 country	 includes	 economically	 valuable	 areas	 separated	 by	 geographic	 boundaries	
(e.g.,	deserts,	bodies	of	water	or	large	distances).98	If	infringement	occurs	within	the	geographic	area	
of	a	partitioned	exclusive	licensee,	they	will	be	in	the	best	position	to	judge	whether	to	ignore	the	
infringing	 act,	 or	 choose	 to	 take	 other	 action,	 including	 threatening	 litigation.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	
patentee,	 the	 licensee	will	 normally	have	a	much	better	understanding	of	 the	market,	 its	 players,	
and,	 quite	 often,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 threat	 of	 litigation	will	 operate	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 in	
negotiation.	 However,	 if	 a	 geographic	 exclusive	 licensee	 must	 co-ordinate	 infringement	 concerns	
through	 the	patentee,	 they	 incur	additional	 transaction	costs	and	 risk	a	 situation	where	 they	may	
not	be	able	to	enforce	the	exclusive	rights	they	bargained	for.	
3.2. Related	Legal	Aspects	




is	 relevant	 because	 obiter	 statements	 from	 the	 High	 Court	 of	 Australia	 suggest	 that	 a	 threat	 of	
litigation	 by	 a	 licensee	without	 standing	would	 constitute	 an	 unjustified	 threat.100	 It	 follows	 then,	
that	if	the	threat	of	litigation	is	to	operate	as	a	bargaining	chip	in	negotiations	between	partitioned	
exclusive	 licensees	and	 infringers,	or	potential	 infringers,	 this	end	will	only	be	achieved	 if	 they	are	













Report’,103	 the	 Board	 of	 Trade	 noted	 that	 exclusive	 licences	 commonly	 include	 clauses	 to	 enable	
licensees	 to	 conduct	 infringement	 actions	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 patentee	 (at	 the	 time	 the	 Act	 only	
permitted	patentees	to	initiate	infringement	actions).104	If	litigation	is	conducted	via	this	mechanism	
and	 patent	 infringement	 is	 proved,	 the	 successful	 litigants	 have	 a	 choice	 between	 an	 account	 of	
profits	 and	 damages.105	 While	 an	 account	 of	 profits	 calculation	 is	 the	 same	 regardless	 of	 whose	
name	the	litigation	is	conducted	under,	a	damages	calculation	is	not;	it	is	based	on	the	harm	done	to	
the	successful,	named	litigant.106	This	means	that,	depending	on	the	licence	agreement,	a	damages	






An	argument	 against	 standing	 for	 partitioned	exclusive	 licensees	 is	 that,	 in	 theory,	 it	 allows	more	
than	two	parties	to	initiate	infringement	actions.	This	could	be	problematic	for	a	number	of	reasons,	
including	what	happens	if	one	or	more	parties	do	not	want	to	initiate	a	suit,	or,	if	the	infringement	
action	 is	 successful,	 how	 relief	 is	 distributed.	 However,	while	 these	 issues	may	 be	more	 complex	
because	more	than	two	parties	are	involved,	they	are	no	different	than	when	a	panoplied	exclusive	




against	 large	 numbers	 of	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 a	 patentee,	
dividing	 patent	 rights	 increases	 negotiation	 and	 other	 transaction	 costs	 and,	 for	 many	 licensees,	











below,	partitioned	exclusive	 licensees	can	 initiate	 infringement	proceedings	 in	the	US	and	UK,	and	
no	commentary	has	specifically	attributed	problems	to	them	doing	so.108	
A	 more	 general	 concern	 with	 patent	 law	 is	 that	 patent	 rights	 may	 be	 enforced	 in	 ways	 which	
undermine	 its	 aim	 as	 a	 welfare	 enhancing	 tool.	 Here,	 the	 conduct	 of	 various	 patent	 assertion	
entities,	 or	 to	 use	 the	 pejorative	 term,	 ‘trolls’,	 is	 a	 relevant	 issue.109	 Arguably,	 by	 limiting	
enforcement	of	patents	to	panoplied	exclusive	licensees,	some	undesirable	conduct	may	be	avoided.	
However,	 limiting	 behaviour	 by	 confining	 enforcement	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 exclusive	 licensees	 is	 a	
blunt	means	to	achieve	such	ends,	especially	when	such	activity	has	not	been	linked	to	partitioned	
exclusive	licences.	
The	analysis	 so	 far	has	not	distinguished	between	different	 types	of	partitioned	exclusive	 licences	
and,	generally	speaking,	most	reasoning	concerning	partitioned	exclusive	licences	applies	equally	to	
all	 three.	However,	 a	 semantic	difference	between	activity-based	exclusive	 licences	 and	 the	other	
two	partitioned	exclusive	 licences	 is	 that	activity-based	exclusive	 licences	wholly	allocate	 separate	
activities	under	 the	definition	of	 ‘exploit’,	whereas	 the	other	 two	 subdivide	 the	activities.	What	 is	
meant	by	 this	 is	 that,	 if	 a	geographic	exclusive	 licence	 is	established	 in	each	 state	of	Australia,	 six	
parties	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 sell,	 import,	 offer	 for	 sale	 etc.,	 the	 patented	 invention.	With	 multiple	
activity-based	exclusive	licences,	only	one	party	has	the	ability	to	make	or	import	etc.	the	invention.	
It	 follows	 that	 there	 is	 legal	 simplicity	 to	 prohibiting	 geographic	 or	 field-of-use	 exclusive	 licensees	
from	 having	 standing	 because	 they	 ‘share’	 an	 activity,	 or	 prohibiting	 activity-based	 exclusive	
licensees	from	having	standing	because	they	cannot	perform	all	the	activities	under	the	definition	of	
‘exploit’.	However,	there	are	three	arguments	that	run	against	both	of	these	propositions.	
First,	 patent	 rights	 have	 always	 been	 able	 to	 be	 split.	 Like	 other	 forms	 of	 personal	 property,110	
















an	activity	 that	 is	not	a	 right	 in	 itself,	 just	an	example	of	what	 ‘exploit’	means,	 is	artificial	and	has	
limited	logical	connection	to	the	justifications	for	patent	rights.		
Third,	 in	 relation	 to	 field-of-use	 exclusive	 licences,	 a	 single	 patent	 often	 consists	 of	 different	
applications	 for	 the	 same	 invention.	 For	 example,	 a	 single	 patent	 to	 non-naturally	 occurring	 DNA	




different	claims	 into	three	separate	applications.	The	benefit	 to	a	patentee	 in	these	circumstances	
would	 be	 that	 they	 could	 create	 panoplied	 exclusive	 licences	 to	 each	 patent.	 Thus,	 preventing	
patentees	 from	 creating	 multiple	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licences	 that	 carry	 standing	 is	 somewhat	
artificial.	The	three	partitioned	exclusive	licences	could,	in	theory,	be	panoplied	exclusive	licences	to	
three	separate	patents.	Indeed,	the	single	patent	scenario	is	preferable	because	it	reduces	work	for	




By	 this,	 it	 is	meant	 that	 the	 licensee	cannot	exclude	all	 third	parties	 from	practising	 the	 invention	
because	some	third	parties	have	separate	permission	from	the	patentee	to	practise	the	invention.	In	
circumstances	 of	multiple	 field-of-use	 exclusive	 licences	 that	 emanate	 from	 the	 same	patent,	 this	
issue	may	 be	 particularly	 problematic.	 This	 can	 be	 demonstrated	 using	 the	 simplistic	 example	 of	
commercialising	 an	 non-naturally	 occurring	 DNA	 patent	 described	 above.	 When	 purportedly	
exclusive	 field-of-use	 licences	 are	 drafted	 to	 each	 area,	 that	 is,	 human	 diagnostics,	 scientific	














value	diminished	based	on	the	way	they	are	 transferred.	The	 foregoing	analysis	also	suggests	 that	
where	a	licensee	is	exclusively	permitted	to	exercise	an	invention	but	is	not	permitted	to	enforce	it	
in	their	own	name,	the	exclusivity	they	have	bargained	for	 is	devalued,	thereby	also	devaluing	the	
patent	 itself.	 Permitting	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees	 to	 enforce	 patents	 gives	 them	 the	
opportunity	 to	 choose	 how	 to	 exploit	 resources	 in	 a	 market	 economy.	 At	 its	 core,	 this	 type	 of	
explanation	 supports	 the	 resource	 allocation	 justifications	 underpinning	 patent	 law.	 Unnecessary	
restrictions	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 enforce	 patent	 rights	 creates	 additional	 transaction	 costs	 and	
unnecessary	 hurdles	 for	 licensees,	 and	 may	 prevent	 licensees	 and	 patentees	 from	 capturing	 the	
benefits	the	patent	system	is	designed	to	confer.	
From	 this	 economic	 point	 of	 view,	 this	 inquiry	 also	 reveals	 that	 focusing	 on	 how	 a	 given	 statute	








Standing	to	 initiate	patent	 infringement	suits	 in	the	US	 is	dictated	by	what	 is	known	as	 ‘prudential	
standing’.113	 In	a	way,	prudential	 standing	 is	more	dynamic	 than	standing	 law	 in	Australian	patent	
law	because	it	can	permit	exclusive	licensees	to	begin	litigation	without	the	patentee	being	added	to	
the	 action	 if	 they	 control	 ‘all	 substantial	 rights’	 in	 a	 patent	 and	 are	 found	 to	 be	 equivalent	 to	 an	
assignee.114	It	also	confers	standing	on	exclusive	licensees	when	they	control	less	than	‘all	substantial	









been	 described	 by	 a	 number	 of	 commentators	 as	 ‘contradictory’,	 ‘confusing’,	 ‘discretionary’,	 and	
‘incoherent’.116	These	descriptors,	however,	are	specifically	targeted	towards	the	use	of	prudential	
standing	in	circumstances	where	a	licensee	can	sue	by	themselves.117	Related	to	this	issue,	in	Alfred	
E	Mann	Foundation	 for	 Scientific	Research	v	Cochlear	Corp,118	 the	Federal	Circuit	non-exhaustively	
listed	nine	different	elements	of	a	licence	that	need	to	be	considered	when	evaluating	whether	the	
licensee	has	‘all	the	substantial	rights’.119	 It	 is	not	the	point	of	this	article	to	offer	a	perspective	on	
this	 issue,	although	 it	 is	noted	that	commentators	have	suggested	reform	 is	needed.120	Rather,	on	
point	with	the	inquiry	in	this	article,	it	can	be	observed	from	the	morass	of	case	law	that	partitioned	
exclusive	licensees	do	have	standing	if	the	patentee	is	joined	in	the	suit.		
The	 statutory	basis	 in	 the	US	 for	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	proceedings	 is	 that	 a	 ‘patentee	
shall	have	remedy	by	civil	action	for	infringement	of	his	patent’.121	Patentee	is	defined	to	include	the	










At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 decision,	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 how	 and	 when	 exclusive	 licensees	 could	 initiate	





















enforce	a	patent	and	when	 they	could	use	 their	own.	This	 last	point	was	of	particular	 importance	







Continuing	 this	 reasoning,	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 in	 absence	 of	 the	 patentee,	 equity	 allowed	 the	
exclusive	licensee	to	use	their	own	name	and	join	the	patentee	without	their	consent.		
In	 the	 intervening	 time,	 relatively	 well	 articulated	 rules	 for	 exclusive	 licensee	 standing	 have	





























From	this	 commentary,	 it	 is	 relatively	clear	 that	US	patent	 law	recognises	 standing	 for	partitioned	
exclusive	licensees.139	It	is	also	interesting	to	note	that	the	reasoning	of	the	Federal	Circuit	in	Ortho	




repealed	 Patents	 Act	 1949.	 In	 the	 1956	 case,	Re	 Courtaulds	 Ltd’s	 Application	 for	 Extension	 of	 the	
Term	of	Letters	Patent	No	511,160	 (‘Courtaulds	Application’),140	Lloyd-Jacob	J	commented	that	 the	
definition	 of	 ‘exclusive	 licensee’	 in	 the	 Patents	 Act	 1949,	 ‘would	 permit	 a	 plurality	 of	 exclusive	
licensees	 to	 be	 created	 in	 respect	 of	 any	 one	 patent	 monopoly’.141	 Since	 the	 Act	 specified	 that	
exclusive	 licensees	 could	 initiate	 infringement	 suits,142	 this	 suggests	 that	 partitioned	 exclusive	
licensees	 had	 standing	 to	 initiate	 infringement	 proceedings.	 However,	Courtaulds	Application	was	
not	 decided	on	whether	 a	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensee	had	 standing	 but	whether	 the	 applicants	
were	 actually	 in	 possession	 of	 a	 licence.143	 Since	 Lloyd-Jacob	 J’s	 found	 the	 applicants	were	 not	 in	
possession	of	a	licence,144	his	Honour’s	comments	are	therefore	obiter.		
Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 two	 additional	 elements	 that	 make	 Lloyd-Jacob	 J’s	 interpretation	
uncontroversial.	First,	the	Board	of	Trade	in	the	Swan	Report	specifically	stated	that	the	definition	of	
exclusive	 licensee	 is	 to	 include	 ‘any	 person	 who	 has	 the	 sole	 and	 exclusive	 right	 to	 work	 the	
invention	in	any	particular	field	of	its	application	or	in	any	particular	geographical	area’.145	Further,	
the	 report	 stated	 that,	 ‘an	 exclusive	 licensee…	 has	 been	 promised	 immunity	 from…	 	 [otherwise]	
legitimate	competition	as	would	spring	from	the	grant	of	additional	 licences.	He	 is	plainly	entitled,	
therefore,	 to	 demand	 protection	 against	 illegitimate	 competition	 of	 infringers.’146	 Second,	 the	















(including	 the	 patentee),	 any	 right	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 patented	 invention,	 and	 "exclusive	 licensee"	
shall	be	construed	accordingly.’147	 In	this	passage,	 the	phrase	 ‘any	right	 in	respect	of	 the	patented	
invention’	suggests	multiplicity.		
Under	current	UK	patent	legislation,	the	Patents	Act	1977,148	standing	to	initiate	patent	infringement	
proceedings	 is	 now	 specified	 in	 Sects.	 61(1)	 and	67(1).	 Sect.	 61(1)	 specifies	 that	 ‘civil	 proceedings	
may	be	brought	 in	 the	court	by	 the	proprietor	of	a	patent	…’149	and	Sect.	67(1)	 specifies	 that	 ‘the	









In	 cases	 under	 the	 new	 Act,	 none	 have	 cited	 the	 Swan	 Report	 or	 Courtaulds	 Application.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 law	 appears	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 In	 Dendron	 GmbH	 v	 University	 of	
California	(No	3),152	the	claimant	applied	to	have	a	party	added	to	an	infringement/revocation	action	
on	the	basis	that	they	were	an	‘exclusive	licensee’.153	The	claimant	wanted	to	add	the	party	for	the	
purpose	 of	 obtaining	 discovery	 from	 them.154	 In	 the	 course	 of	 his	 Honour’s	 decision,	 Pumfrey	 J	
stated	 that	 ‘separate	 exclusive	 licences	 can,	 to	 all	 appearances,	 be	 granted	 in	 respect	 of	 distinct	
rights	 under	 a	 patent.	 Thus,	 for	 example	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	 separate	 exclusive	 licences	 may	 be	
granted	to	manufacture	and	to	 import	a	patented	product.’155	However,	this	case	was	not	decided	
on	whether	 the	third	party	was	a	 type	of	exclusive	 licensee	and	should	therefore	be	added	to	the	
action;	rather,	it	was	on	whether	the	party	exclusively	controlled	any	patent	rights.156	Since,	Pumfrey	
J’s	 found	 the	party	 in	question	did	not	exercise	any	exclusive	 rights,157	his	Honour’s	 comments	on	














consistent	 line	of	 reasoning	 indicating	 that	partitioned	exclusive	 licensees	do	have	 standing	under	
the	UK	Act	does	exist.158	
4.3. Summary	on	US	and	UK	Standing	Law	
The	 examination	 of	 US	 and	UK	 standing	 law	 provided	 in	 this	 part	 demonstrates	 that	 both	 patent	
regimes	 confer,	 or	 are	 likely	 to	 confer,	 standing	 on	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees.	 This	 outcome	
weighs	 in	 favour	 of	 broadening	Australian	 standing	 law	 to	 include	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees,	






may	 encounter	 additional	 transaction	 costs	 associated	with	 enforcement	 in	 the	 patentee’s	 name,	
including	a	reduced	amount	of	damages,	or	prohibition	from	enforcing	the	patent.	In	addition,	costs	
in	the	global	exploitation	of	patents	will	be	 increased	by	requiring	 legal	advice	on	an	 issue	that,	as	
demonstrated	above,	has	no	compelling	reason	for	its	existence.		
5. Conclusion	
The	 legal	 and	economic	 reasoning	presented	 in	 this	 article	 provides	 significant	 support	 for	 patent	
law	 providing	 standing	 to	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees.	 In	 particular,	 the	 ability	 for	 partitioned	
exclusive	licensees	to	choose	how	and	when	infringement	is	initiated	aligns	with	the	patent	regime’s	
role	 in	 incentivising	 innovation	 and	 complements	 the	 role	 of	 patents	 in	 a	 market	 economy.	 This	
conclusion	 aligns	 with	 the	 recommendation	 from	 the	 Intellectual	 Property	 Committee	 of	 the	
Business	 Law	 Section	 of	 the	 Law	 Council	 of	 Australia,	 who	 emphasised	 the	 adverse	 commercial	
ramifications	of	the	current	law.160	Conferring	standing	on	partitioned	exclusive	licensees	would	also	
harmonise	 Australian	 law	 with	 key	 trading	 partners.	 This	 position,	 however,	 is	 the	 diametric	
opposite	of	Australia’s	current	patent	standing	law.	It	is	possible	that	a	future	High	Court	of	Australia	
decision	 could	 establish	 that	 partitioned	 exclusive	 licensees	 do	 have	 standing	 under	 the	 current	
wording	of	 the	Patents	Act.	However,	 this	 seems	 to	be	a	 rather	 ineffective	method	 to	change	 the	
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